Argumentation Network of the Americas

Argumentation in the Power and Politics of Democracy

Book of Abstracts

Conference Organizers:

Hugo Mota and Michael D. Baumtrog

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KEYNOTE ADDRESSES

Catarina Dutilh Novaes
Free University of Amsterdam & University of St. Andrews

The (ir)rationality of propaganda

Propaganda is typically understood as communication that is used primarily to influence or persuade an audience to adopt certain opinions and behaviors, often in the context of politics and public discourse. In common parlance, the term 'propaganda' tends to have very negative connotations; propagandistic discourse is viewed as based on lies and deceit, and as aiming at emotional manipulation of the masses exclusively for the benefit of the propagandist. Thus understood, propaganda is often contrasted with *rational discourse*, in particular reasoned argumentation, which purportedly aims at the truth and does not mislead its audience. In a nutshell, propaganda is 'bad' while rational argumentation is 'good', and the two categories are sharply distinguished.

In this talk, I argue that this dichotomy is overly simplistic. Conceptions of rationality used to define propaganda negatively are often quite contentious, in particular the purported contrast between 'reason' and 'emotion'. Moreover, rational argumentation that aims at persuasion is functionally similar to propaganda in that it aims at interfering with the belief states of other agents. Thus understood, argumentation also has a coercive component. If so, then the purported opposition to rational discourse is not a suitable response to what we may describe as the 'demarcation problem' for propaganda (what counts as propaganda and what does not). I present an alternative, non-pejorative conceptualization of propaganda, and discuss some criteria that may distinguish 'good' from 'bad' propaganda from an ethical/moral point of view.

John Dryzek
University of Canberra

Expressive Epistemic Injustice

Epistemic injustice means that knowledge relevant to collective decisions gets discounted, thus inflicting harm on disadvantaged groups. The most familiar kinds (established by Fricker 2007) are testimonial (dismissing arguments because of the social characteristics of the speaker) and hermeneutical (lack of collective interpretive resources to make sense of oppression). Expressive epistemic injustice can be defined as a systematic misalignment between an individual or group's values and beliefs on the one hand, and expressed wants on the other. Expressive epistemic injustice can persist even if testimonial and hermeneutic injustice were to be eliminated. The degree of misalignment can be quantified, enabling an empirical analysis of multiple cases to locate the source of expressive epistemic injustice in the conditions of discourse in a public sphere awash in symbolic manipulations by relatively powerful actors. Citizen deliberation proves capable of correcting expressive epistemic injustice. This analysis adds to existing epistemic arguments for deliberative democracy, for it shows that deliberation increases the likelihood that collective decisions will respond to the values and beliefs that define these decisions as good to begin with.

June 7 Speakers

Giselly Tiago Ribeiro Amado

Universidade Federal de Uberlândia

Ditadura Militar: Uma Análise Discursiva Do Funcionamento Algorítmico Do Google

Este trabalho tem como objetivo analisar, a partir do funcionamento algorítmico do site de buscas Google, a construção de sentidos nos processos de nomeação do golpe militar, que instaurou a ditadura militar no Brasil. Esta temática passou a ficar em evidência quando o ex-presidente Jair Bolsonaro determinou que no dia 31 de março de 2019 as Forças Armadas celebrassem o aniversário de cinquenta e cinco anos do golpe militar. Este acontecimento discursivo provocou uma relação de equívoco de datas (1964 – 2019) que possibilitou o aparecimento do ano 2019 em referência ao golpe militar nos resultados de algumas buscas no Google. Nestes resultados, há uma disputa de sentidos relacionada aos processos de nomeação "golpe" - "revolução" militar brasileira, que procura estabilizar os sentidos impostos pelos discursos hegemônicos em prol de um grupo. Argumento, então, que o político está na linguagem de diversos modos, entre os quais podem ficar visíveis os jogos de poder que podem transformar as concepções históricas e/ou sociais incluindo as formas de estudá-la. Levando em conta a metodologia da Análise do Discurso fundada por Michel Pêcheux para a compreensão sobre os modos de dizer, analisamos o corpus formado por vinte e cinco sequências discursivas construídas a partir do resultado de sete buscas no Google, a saber: 1) ditadura militar no Brasil, 2) ditadura militar no Brasil 2019, 3) revolução militar no Brasil, 4) revolução militar no Brasil 2019, 5) golpe militar no Brasil, 6) golpe militar no Brasil 2019 e 7) golpe ou revolução. No batimento entre descrição e interpretação compreendemos os sentidos em deslocamento e problematizamos acerca dos encaminhamentos em torno do tema ditadura militar brasileira e os efeitos de sentido produzidos a partir do acontecimento discursivo datado de 2019, em uma tentativa de ressignificação como um processo de estabilização de sentidos.

Christoph Lumer

University of Siena

Epistemically Good Arguments in Democratic Political Deliberation

The conference "Argumentation in the Power and Politics of Democracy" aims to discuss diverse problems of the connection between argumentation, power and political participation. The proposed paper attempts to contribute to the solution of one particular of these problems: even before specific problems of power and distortion of argumentation can be addressed, do we even know what would be good arguments in democratic political deliberations? Sure, argumentation theory contains many normative, more or less elaborated approaches to determining criteria for good arguments. But these criteria mostly refer to small, elementary and thematically neutral arguments such as deductive arguments, arguments from expert opinion, ends-means arguments, which, for example, do not address questions such as these: Which thesis about a political measure does one have to argue for at all, if one wants to justify this measure? What would the corresponding complex arguments have to be like?

In view of this general normative question, the aim of this contribution is to develop and justify precise epistemic criteria, rules for good political arguments in political deliberation, by which in the broad sense

political measures are justified. Among other things, the question, already mentioned, is discussed, i.e., what kind of theses must be argued for in arguments in order to justify political measures, and which argumentation-theoretical approaches are suitable for providing epistemologically substantiated rules for arguments for such theses, rules whose compliance implies the truth or at least acceptability of the thesis? Such rule systems are presented.

More precisely, (1) it is argued, on the basis of a theory of deliberative democracy, that the justification of a political measure m consists in argumentatively justifying theses of the type: 'Among the feasible measures, m promotes the general good the most / m is the morally best.' (2) After a discussion of the problem of de facto social pluralism with regard to the criteria for the morally good (3), other important types of theses are determined that must be justified in public argumentation, e.g., 'm is morally required' or 'm will have consequence c with probability l (likelihood)'. (4) A discussion of diverse approaches in argumentation theory filters out the epistemological approach to argumentation as the one that is most likely to provide criteria for epistemically good arguments with which such theses can be justified. Other approaches do not provide any criteria at all for these types of theses and certainly not epistemologically based ones. (5) On the basis of the precise criteria for good arguments for diverse types of theses developed within this approach, the criteria for good public arguments with the mentioned types of theses are then presented. (6) Concluding considerations are devoted to the question of how it can be achieved that such criteria for good public argumentation are observed.

Marcin Lewiński
New University of Lisbon

Managing Authority in Argumentation

Argumentation theories traditionally abstract from the question of power inequalities between arguers. Power relationships should dissipate when confronted with the "forceless force of the better argument" (Habermas, 1984; 1989). Well-developed approaches, such as pragma-dialectics (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984; 2004), embody this abstraction via specific design of the normative standards and rules governing argumentative exchanges. Rational discussions should guarantee freedom of all arguers in advancing positions and raising objections, their equal standing over the course of discussion, and mutual agreement on the shared starting points for the discussion. (I will characterize this as the LEF model, from the Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité principles of the French Revolution.) These "first-order" conditions are further shielded by the stipulation of "higher-order conditions" for argumentation, which dictate equal intellectual and socio-political capabilities of arguers (van Eemeren et al., 1993). In this way, authority is managed out of argumentation.

The goal of my contribution is to sketch an alternative path: unequal distribution of arguers' authority should not be managed out of normative models of argumentation, but rather managed in them. I will understand authority in terms of both epistemic authority, when one of the arguers has privileged access to some epistemic resources by virtue of being an expert in the field, an eyewitness, etc., and deontic authority, whereby one of the arguers is in a position to better control the conditions of discussion, due to her higher deontic (e.g., administrative) status (Bocheński, 1965; Lewiński, 2022).

To this end, I will first defend argumentation as an adversarial and multi-party activity, and then propose the Let Authority Function Fairly (LAFF) principle for argumentative discussions. This principle is underwritten by a contrastive comparison of various arguers' authority, and it should be a rule of rational discussions that authority is distributed fairly among arguers. I will further illustrate the functioning of this principle with two strategies of argumentative discussions: 1) seeking, giving, and receiving advice (Lackey, 2018; Lewiński,

2022; van Poppel, 2019) and 2) interpreting other discussants' argumentation, a topic of much debate in the discipline (Govier, 1987; Adler, 1996; Bondy, 2010; Paglieri & Woods, 2011; Lewiński, 2012; Stevens, 2019; 2021). These two strategies show how apparently innocuous argumentative moves can unduly deflate but also inflate another's authority, typically via covert accommodation, rather than overt illocutionary force (Langton, 2018; Witek, 2021). I will conclude by characterising these as strategies of "soft power" that can be used both for good and for ill in argumentation.

Matthew Shields

Wake Forest University

The Perils of Epistemic Idealism

In this paper, I identify a phenomenon I call 'epistemic idealism'. A view is epistemically idealist when it assumes that defects in our epistemic lives are best addressed by identifying good epistemic practices and encouraging individuals and communities to adopt these practices. I argue that epistemic idealism is often misguided because it obscures the material changes that are a pre-requisite for any changes in an individual's or community's epistemic practices.

I give three examples of projects from recent social epistemology that fall prey to epistemic idealism. The first is Alexander Guerrero's proposal to address the problem of "strategic expertise contexts" – i.e., contexts where the candidate experts have "economic, professional, [and] personal" interests that may impact their claims and therefore give us some reason to be skeptical of their claims (2017, 157). Guerrero's proposal is to pursue "institutional reform" and create a "Database of Experts" that would allow a community to observe vetted information on an expert's track record and credentials (179). While Guerrero previously notes the insidious, corrupting influence of material interests on researchers, he does not consider that his own proposal would be subject to these very same material forces, leaving the underlying material problems unaddressed and the value of his solution unclear. The second example is O'Connor and Weatherall's proposal in *The Misinformation Age* that to combat misinformation, we need to "reimagine democracy" to make it genuinely responsive to expert knowledge (184). Every major case study they cite of misinformation, however, is the result of private interests manipulating the workings of science. While they concede in passing that "we must abandon industry funding of research", the role of private interests and the profit motive as the source of this epistemic plight and the steps needed to combat these forces go undiscussed (181). Third, Neil Levy argues in *Bad Beliefs* that given that nearly all of our beliefs are inherited from those we trust, we need to "structure the environment to nudge agents toward better beliefs" by, for example, ensuring "that markers of expertise correlate with genuine expertise; that a view is represented in the media in rough correlation with the proportion of experts who hold it", combatting predatory journals, avoiding false balance in media, and no-platforming certain speakers (2022, 146). But Levy argues throughout that the primary epistemic problem we face is untrustworthy figures posing as experts having the trust of communities. Such figures are often the result of "[i]ndustry funding", which is "a general and central source of epistemic pollution" (116). And yet Levy's solutions do not address this underlying material reality.

Rather than pursuing epistemic idealism and the assumption that encouraging better epistemic practices will solve these problems, I argue that we should acknowledge that the primary obstacle to our epistemic flourishing is an economic order that prioritizes profit above all. We must also accept that effective tactics for combating this economic order and resulting epistemic disasters will not be revealed by more epistemology, but lie in political projects that their home largely outside of philosophy.

Michael Guedes da Rocha
Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro - UFRJ

O testemunho de especialistas: como julgadores deveriam avaliar argumentos cujo conteúdo não compreendem?

Uma das grandes contribuições do Renascimento foi a revolução epistemológica que permitiu cogitar a existência de um mundo objetivo o qual talvez fosse alcançado através de evidências. O forte apego às evidências científicas em lugar do conhecimento secular foi uma das consequências dessa revolução.

Com o tempo, a ciência obteve expressiva ressonância nos mais diversos âmbitos — inclusive no jurídico. Afinal, a tomada de decisão também demanda do julgador uma preocupação com o conhecimento do mundo, seja quando este tem de refletir sobre fatos que importam a um caso concreto ou ao predicado fático de uma norma jurídica.

Entretanto, com o passar dos anos e a sofisticação constante da ciência, tornou-se árdua a tarefa de avaliar argumentos que a acionam em contexto decisório. Isso na medida em que os julgadores têm de lidar com uma categoria probatória cujo conteúdo — enquanto leigos — muito pouco podem compreender. Os responsáveis pela oferta de argumentos científicos tampouco ajudam: especialistas frequentemente são incapazes de fornecer informações em formato cognitivamente acessível o suficiente ao ponto de que contribuam à redução dos déficits informativos dos decisores. O problema ganha contornos de maior preocupação em tribunais superiores, nos quais as decisões sobre fatos não afetam apenas uma causa específica, mas, sim, expressiva parte de todo o sistema de justiça.

Partindo desses pressupostos, a apresentação será centrada em discutir modelagens de valoração de argumentos científicos tendo como norteadora a questão 'como julgadores deveriam avaliar argumentos cujo conteúdo não compreendem?'. Com esses compromissos em mente, três serão os momentos da exposição: (i) considerações epistêmicas sobre o desafio de avaliar argumentos de especialistas — com ênfase nos tribunais superiores; (ii) apresentação do modelo educacional de valoração de argumentos científicos e problematização da proposta de que se juízes não sabem ciência, então basta educa-los para que passem a compreende-la; (iii) apresentação de um modelo de deferência crítica, defendendo-o não apenas como o mais apropriado em termos práticos como também democráticos.

Raquel Wachtler Pandolpho
Universidade Federal de Sergipe

Aspásia de Mileto e Górgias de Leontinos: estrangeiros inventando Atenas

No intuito de sofisticar a história da argumentação, cabe arriscar uma aproximação entre a feitiçaria sofística de Górgias de Leontinos e a magia retórica de Aspásia de Mileto, perspicaz *hetaira* que seduziu e conduziu Péricles. Segundo importantíssimas fontes para os estudos sofísticos, Aspásia floresceu o estilo oratório de suas alunas e alunos, principalmente de seu parceiro, Péricles, enfeitando seus discursos com tons gorgianos. Esta foi uma impressão deixada, em especial, naqueles que tiveram oportunidade de ler o diálogo *Aspásia* de Ésquines. Sem a materialidade do diálogo, resta investigar porque a doxografia, especulando sobre este *Aspásia* perdido, atribui ao ensino retórico da sofista jônia as marcas estilísticas caracteristicamente gorgianas. Pretendo mostrar a relevância política do poder sofístico e a influência que as técnicas oratórias do retor leontino, ressoando nos ensinamentos proporcionados pela educadora milésia, desfrutaram nos debates do séc. V e IV a.C. Comparando os *epitáphioi* que possuem certa autoria

aspasiana e o único fragmento sobrevivente da oração fúnebre escrita por Górgias, destaco o fato de que ambos sofistas apresentaram, em sua produção de elogios fúnebres, a preocupação de louvar os mortos conduzindo os vivos, às vezes necromantes, abrindo caminhos oratórios para deixar os fantasmas falarem. O que esta produção sofística de *epitáphioi* demonstra é que, uma vez estrangeiros, se os sofistas desejassem influenciar indiretamente o campo da política, eles precisavam utilizar estratégias persuasivas infalíveis de condução psicagógica. É, sobretudo, nesse aspecto ético-político que aproximo o *Epitáfio* de Górgias dos *epitáphioi* de autoria aspasiana. Enfatizando que a educação proporcionada pela escola aspasiana foi poderosa a ponto de implantar e florescer um estilo gorgianizado na oratória de Péricles, não somente contribui para uma percepção mais justa da milésia, mas também para modificar a memória sobre o famoso estadista ateniense. Péricles, o Olimpo, enquanto aluno e amante de Aspásia, é o primeiro cidadão, conduzindo atenienses e, ao mesmo tempo, é um homem apaixonado conduzido por uma estrangeira da Ásia menor. Suponho, ao lado de alguns comentadores da doxografia aspasiana, que o diferencial entre o Péricles antes e depois de Aspásia seja exatamente a sofisticação que a força da sua palavra adquiriu por meio do aperfeiçoamento técnico-persuasivo, da sofisticação refinada e da introdução dos discursos de aparato redigidos por sua parceira e logógrafa de confiança. Por fim, minha hipótese adicional é dizer, levando a sério o testemunho de Filóstrato, que "aguçar a língua à maneira de Górgias" é o verdadeiro diferencial que a educação aspasiana floresceu na oratória de Péricles. Ou seja, sofisticou a sobriedade ática do orador ateniense com um estilo gorgianizado, cosmético, ornamental, enfeitado, aparatado, asiático, feminino e efeminado.

Thor João de Sousa Veras
Federal University of Santa Catarina

Captured freedom: The "libertarian populist" threat to deliberative democracy

This presentation aims to criticize the populist capture of the grammar of freedom by the rhetoric and discourse of far-right platforms as a pathological phenomenon of democratic regression. To this end, we will reconstruct the political and epistemic advantages of the Habermasian conception of political deliberation, rational argumentation, and its conception of social freedom as a model of radical democracy. Next, we will show how the discourse of what we will call "libertarian populism", an alliance between the rhetoric of far-right populism of an authentic people and the ultra-individualist neoliberal discourse governed by the laws of the free market, would be the result of a new structural change in the public sphere, caused by the processes of regressive modernization. Finally, we will criticize this phenomenon as a pathology of the democratic public sphere and consequently a pathology of communication, argumentation and mutual understanding, which blocks the possibilities of a conception of democracy that is not voluntarist or decisionist, undermines the bases of a deliberative policy, obstructs the circulation of a communicative rationality oriented to mutual understanding and propagates a conception of freedom that generates fragmentation of the   consciences and an erosion of the constitutional and rational foundations of deliberative democracy.

June 8 Speakers

Constanza Ihnen
University of Chile

Deliberative democracy and "strategic manoeuvring": A response to agonistic pluralism?

The deliberative model of democracy is often presented as a means for overcoming problems of political legitimacy and citizen's indifference and alienation. Specifically, deliberative theory claims that it is possible to address these problems through the institutional design of a procedure in which collective decisions are the outcome of a fair and reasonable argumentative exchange, among all those potentially affected or their representatives (e.g., Manin 1987, Cohen 1989, Habermas 1992).

However, the theory of deliberative democracy has been criticised on several fronts. One of the strongest criticisms has come from another strain of democratic theory known as agonistic pluralism (e.g., Mouffe 1999; 2005). This theory argues that, by claiming to legitimise decisions in a rational consensus among all concerned, the deliberative ideal promotes a procedure that denies conflict, and privileges reasons over passions. This would be problematic at least for two reasons. First, because by denying conflict, deliberative democracy also denies politics, which is inherently agonistic (Mouffe 1993); and second, because by privileging the appeal to reasons over passions in discourse, it prevents voters from identifying with political projects (Mouffe 2000).

In this paper I will attempt to address both criticisms by re-conceptualising argumentative moves in a discursive exchange in terms of a 'strategic manoeuvre'. The concept, developed by the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation (e.g., van Eemeren & Houtlosser 1999, van Eemeren 2010), allows one to analyse an argumentative move as a speech act aimed at simultaneously achieving two goals: resolving a difference of opinion in a reasonable way (i.e., according to the merits of the case), and resolving that difference in their own favour. I will argue that this re-conceptualisation of argumentative moves makes it at least theoretically possible to reconcile the search for rational consensus with the claimed agonistic nature of politics in democratic contexts, as well as the presentation of reasons with the appeal to pathos, as instruments of political mobilisation.

Joanice Soares de Sousa
Federal University of Southern and Southeastern Pará

Análise Do Gênero Sentença De Pronúncia Nas Bases Argumentativas Diante Dos Crimes De Feminicídio

Este trabalho propõe-se a investigar a presença do machismo institucional em decisões de pronúncia proferidas em processos de apuração de crime de feminicídio. A temática proposta parte de algo frequente nos noticiários brasileiros. Não obstante o avanço da legislação penal, com as contribuições da Lei Maria da Penha (2021), os índices de violência sexual, agressão física, ameaça e feminicídio continuam em evidência no meio social, nesse sentido, tratar desse assunto é quebrar paradigmas patriarcais impostos no meio social diante da figura feminina. Sob esse viés, pretende-se analisar a constituição dos interlocutores, a estrutura argumentativa e a presença do machismo nas referidas sentenças, fazendo uso de ferramentas teórico-metodológicas como da Teoria da Argumentação no Discurso para analisar os depoimentos dos

acusados, os argumentos da defesa e os argumentos da Promotoria. Desse modo, embasamo-nos teoricamente em autores como Fiorin (2015), que explana sobre a argumentação, Ruth Amossy (2018), com argumentação no discurso, e Mikhail Bakhtin (2006), que reflete sobre a questão do gênero do discurso, o qual resulta em uma forma padrão "relativamente estável" de um enunciado, apontando que nos comunicamos, falamos e escrevemos através de gêneros do discurso. Os resultados da pesquisa ainda são parciais, pois no momento, encontra-se em fase de levantamento bibliográfico e constituição do corpus.

Leandro De Brasi
Universidad de La Frontera

Democratic Deliberation and Civic Education

Since the second part of the 20th Century, democracy has been regarded as the only legitimate political arrangement. On a normative level, democracy now represents an undisputed background. Moreover, whether one is a deliberative democrat or not, democratic deliberation, as an instance of our division of cognitive labour, has a crucial role to play in the generation of politically-related epistemic goods.

However, to reap the epistemic benefits of this argumentative deliberation, the deliberators need to instantiate a certain diversity and intellectual character. So, it is argued that the educational system should both foster the development of this character and promote the practice of argumentative deliberation in a relevantly diverse setting to contribute to the acquisition of epistemic goods.

Our epistemic reliance on others isn't limited to the transmission of epistemic goods. We also depend on others in the generation of them. This is most clearly appreciated in science's close collaborations. Of course, collaborative relations within a group can be multifarious but the close collaboration here alluded to involves interactional, collective work, where the group's members are jointly tackling some issue and the end result depends on the quality of the reasons provided by their joint efforts. This sort of close collaboration is found in different contexts and about different issues. These argumentative deliberations can significantly increase our epistemic performance.

There are a series of reasons as to why this is so. For example, as we´ll see, they can neutralize individual cognitive shortcomings, such as biases, and group pathologies, such as polarization. So, his arguing together in a communicative way can then lead to epistemically good outcomes, but whether it does so clearly depends on the existence of some cognitive diversity, and particularly diversity of opinions. Moreover, it is argued that the deliberators also need to be intellectually humble and autonomous. Intellectual humility, briefly put, is the virtuous mean between epistemic arrogance and self-deprecation. So, this virtue involves some sort of epistemic confidence management (of one's beliefs and capacities). Intellectual autonomy, in short, is the virtue that reduces sheer epistemic dependence on others by promoting a willingness and ability to think critically for oneself in judging views, without capitulating to hyper-individualism. So, this virtue involves some sort of epistemic dependence management.

Given the above, one aim of the educational institution should be to develop the intellectual virtues of humility and autonomy in the students so for them to be able to exploit argumentative deliberation in their epistemic lives and, in particular, related to political matters. Moreover, if they also are to take advantage of this practice within the educational institution to promote the acquisition of epistemic goods, the classroom should provide the students the relevantly diverse setting required for it.

Sergio Schargel
Federal University of Rio de Janeiro

O que defendia o Fascismo dias antes da Marcha sobre Roma? Análise e tradução do Discurso de Nápoles, de Benito Mussolini
What did Fascism argue days before the March on Rome? Analysis and translation of the Discurso de Nápoles, by Benito Mussolini

Muito se diz que a Marcha Sobre Roma teria sido um golpe de Estado. Contudo, ao contrário do que se crê no senso comum, a Marcha sobre Roma não foi um golpe em si. Mussolini não rompeu com as instituições subitamente, mas utilizou a pressão de sua marcha de 30 mil homens para enfraquecer a credibilidade do governo liberal. O chefe de Estado, temendo uma guerra civil é uma alternativa à esquerda, achou por menor dos males tornar Mussolini chefe de governo, entregando o Executivo Federal. Ante a questão sobre quais características apareciam no Fascismo quando da Marcha, a intenção deste artigo é analisar e traduzir o *Discurso de Nápoles*, declarado dois dias antes da Marcha, visando apontar algumas de suas principais características e sua relação com os períodos anteriores e posteriores do Fascismo. A análise e tradução inéditas permitirão ampliar o estado da arte nos estudos sobre o Fascismo, ao mostrar algumas reconstruções de seus traços e principais elementos que aparecem no discurso, proferido nas vésperas de uma efeméride essencial para o Fascismo. Para isso, o artigo lançará mão de uma base teórica com material de Gianni Fresu e Robert Paxton, além de uma estratégia de análise de conteúdo, com apoio na plataforma *Wordclouds*.

It is often said that the March on Rome would have been a coup. In reality, however, despite his distinctly coup-based pretensions, Mussolini came to power through the legal channels of Italian parliamentarism. Faced with the research question about which characteristics appeared in Fascism during the March, the intention of this article is to analyze and translate the Speech of Naples, declared two days before the March, aiming to point out some of its main characteristics and its relationship with previous and post periods of Fascism. The analysis and translation, unpublished in Portuguese, will make it possible to expand the state of the art in studies on Fascism, by showing some reconstructions of its features. For this, the article will make use of a theoretical basis with material by Gianni Fresu and Robert Paxton, in addition to a hermeneutic methodological strategy of close reading, supported by the Wordclouds platform.

Jorge Durán Solórzano
Leiden University Center for Linguistics

El uso del término "terrorista" por parte del Estado como tropo militar: Un análisis argumentativo del término aplicado a movimientos armados en México

Los movimientos armados han sido una constante en América Latina desde la segunda mitad del siglo veinte. Durante ese período y hasta la fecha, la región ha visto surgir a decenas de guerrillas que, provenientes de movimientos sociales pacíficos, optaron por la vía de las armas al ver que la vía política y legal se encontraba cerrada. En el caso de México, un caso atípico en la región si se piensa que en ese país no hubo formalmente una dictadura militar como sí las hubo en Argentina, Chile, Brasil, Paraguay, Uruguay y Bolivia, las luchas armadas surgieron a partir de condiciones sociales precarias y la represión policíaco-militar de protestas pacíficas y legales. Grupos armados como el Partido de los Pobres, la Liga Comunista 23 de Septiembre y las Fuerzas Revolucionarias Armadas del Pueblo entre 1960 y 1970, y

posteriormente el Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional en 1994, declararon la guerra al Estado Mexicano, lo que les valió que fueran etiquetados como terroristas.

Partiendo del trabajo de Gascón (2023) sobre la definición de terrorismo, esta presentación busca contribuir a la discusión sobre el uso del término retomando el trabajo de Carlos Montemayor (2012) sobre las guerrillas en México y las estrategias utilizadas desde el Estado para hacer frente a los grupos armados. Siguiendo a ambos autores, argumento que las condiciones de aplicación de la definición de "terrorista" sirven a una estrategia de seguridad que busca vaciar de causalidad social el surgimiento de conflictos armadas para darles una resolución policíaca-militar. En este sentido, el uso del término "terrorista" funciona como un tropo militar que busca deslegitimar los argumentos sociales y políticos de dichos movimientos, cerrando con ello las vías políticas para resolver dichos conflictos.

Para ilustrar lo anterior, reviso el tropo del "terrorista" mediante un análisis socio-forense del discurso (Tomlinson 2010) de un intercambio de argumentos públicos en el marco de las negociaciones de paz entre el Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional y el gobierno de México (1994-1996), en donde el último acusa de terroristas a la dirigencia zapatista. El análisis muestra que el término terrorista es utilizado como un tropo de seguridad que descalifica cualquier forma de argumento político y justificando la acción militar del Estado. Concluyo mi presentación con un par de reflexiones sobre nuestra posicionalidad como analistas y teóricos de la argumentación y la importancia de ser cautelosos al utilizar términos como "terrorismo" y "terrorista" que llevan consigo una impronta Estado-centrista y que, en el caso de algunos conflictos sociales, adoptar esas categorías beneficia el punto de vista de una de las partes.

Daniel Mejía S.
University of Windsor

¿Cómo definir hechos de violencia? Análisis al debate público colombiano
How to define the facts of violence? Analysis of the Colombian public debate

"New massacre shakes Colombia: eight young people were murdered in Samaniego, Nariño" (Vanguardia, 2020). Headlines like these are frequent in Colombia. Despite the signing of the peace agreement between the Colombian state and the FARC guerrilla in 2016, the armed conflict has not ceased, especially in territories disputed by armed groups. In light of this new massacre, former President Iván Duque visited Nariño from where he held a security council that began with a redefinition of the facts: they are not massacres, but collective homicides. In his words: "Many people have said: 'the massacres are back, the massacres are back', first let's talk about the precise name: 'collective homicides', and sadly we have to accept it as a country, it is not that they are back, it is that these events have sadly not gone away" (Duque, 2020).

This speech caused great controversy in the country. Different sectors of the society manifested against the term collective 'homicides' and in favour of the term 'massacre'. Journalists, politicians, human rights activists, and academics disputed the term used by the government and defended the use of the term massacre to categorize acts of violence such as the one that occurred in Nariño. Despite the negative response from the aforementioned sectors, the president and other senior government officials defended the term collective homicide on different occasions.

This discussion can be understood as one episode in a broader discussion about how to define the situation of violence in Colombia. Julder Gómez (2015) reconstructs this discussion by grouping arguments for and against three definitions of the situation of violence: civil war, internal armed conflict, and terrorist aggression. The general discussion on the definition of the situation of violence, as well as the particular discussion on the definition of violent events, are of vital importance for the Colombian public debate. Moreover, from these discussions, it is possible to analyze the role of definitions in political argumentation.

In this presentation I will reconstruct the discussion on the definition of violent events in order to explain the disagreement between the government's definition (collective homicides) and the definition of those who reacted to the government (massacres). In other words, I am interested in understanding why the government's definition was controversial. To accomplish this, I will first present a brief history of the term collective homicides. This is necessary, as it allows us to understand the technical nature of the definition. I will then reconstruct the discussion between the two definitions, and end with some general conclusions. This text will provide an overview of the discussion that can be used for future normative analysis on the use of definitions in political argumentation.

Ángel Adrián González Delgado
Universidad Autónoma de Nayarit

Culture of peace and culture of argumentation
Cultura de paz y cultura de la argumentación

A finales del siglo XX la UNESCO presentó la "Declaración y Programa de Acción sobre una Cultura de Paz", a partir de esta se exhorta a las naciones unidas a incluir en sus agendas proyectos de corto, mediano y largo plazo que tengan como uno de sus objetivos primaries acciones que influyan en el establecimiento de la paz. El hecho mismo de la publicación de esta declaración resultó sumamente interesante y filosóficamente significativo puesto que, ya sea de forma explícita o implícita, suscitó diversas reflexiones críticas en torno al significado mismo de la paz, sobre su estatus teleológico, acerca de qué acciones contribuyen para que la paz se alcance y perdure, o cuáles son las condiciones necesarias para que esta se dé y se establezca. En este ensayo filosófico nos interesa abordar principalmente las ultimas reflexiones señaladas, esto es, nuestra pregunta guía para este trabajo será: ¿Cuáles son, asumiendo que existen, las condiciones necesarias para una cultura de paz? Ahora bien, esta pregunta puede tener varios sentidos y por ende varias respuestas posibles. Dados los objetivos de esta presentación y el tiempo considerado para la misma, el sentido de la pregunta guía que asumiremos se centrará en las personas que conformarán esa cultura y lo que se necesita de estas: saberes y disposiciones, para darle vida. Nuestra tesis será que, esas condiciones forman parte de, o se enmarcan en, una "Cultura de la argumentación"; en otros términos, una condición necesaria para el establecimiento de una cultura de paz es el desarrollo de una cultura de la argumentación.

Buscando ofrecer un seguimiento claro y sencillo de nuestra presentación, desarrollaremos nuestra charla como sigue: (1) Dilucidación de los conceptos "Cultura de paz" según la Declaración de la UNESCO, (2) Exposición grosso modo lo que es, o se entiende aquí por "Cultura de la argumentación"; para finalizar (3) Se introducirá el argumento según el cual se sostiene que el establecimiento de una cultura de paz requiere como condición necesaria el desarrollo previo de una cultura de la argumentación

Justin Eckstein
Pacific Lutheran University

HUResist's Sound Tactics

Argumentation scholars have been exploring potential beyond verbal argument including sound (e.g., Eckstein, 2017; Eckstein, 2018; Kišiček 2018; and Groarke 2018) This presentation is interested in the subfield of social movements and protest and asks, how does sound provide a resource for resistance?

Eckstein (2017) argues sound provides three unique features: intensity, immersion, and immediacy. This essay focuses on "intensity", or how listening to sound exerts a continued pressure--because as a sonic wave dissipates demands a listener discern a new signal from noise. I will examine the specific case study of HUResist, a concerned collective of Howard University students that formed right after the Trump presidency began. Over the course of 18 months, HUResist used its status as students in a university to assert its demands against an institution that they felt was failing to uphold its duties. However, it can be challenging to force the administration to the table given the diverse audience and broad context. HUResist navigated its movement by improvising, a technique that allowed them to choose sound tactics that leveraged opportunities in different circumstances to turn them into positions of strength. They were able to use the need for Howard to create potential meaning out of all of the noise to exert force upon the situation and desire the conversation. I will conclude by talking about what it means for a move to be "sound".

Tania Rodríguez Martínez

Universidad Autónoma de Nayarit

Argumentación e injusticia epistémica

Recientemente han surgido diversos estudios que vinculan las teorías de la argumentación y análisis de violencias e injusticias, confrontaciones políticas o adversarialidad. Para este trabajo, interesa particularmente el estudio de las injusticias, pero no en general sino de tipo epistémico. El estudio que buscamos desarrollar y presentar a grandes rasgos es aquel que vincula la teoría de la argumentación, particularmente desde la pragma-dialéctica, se dirige hacia la injusticia epistémica. En este sentido, la problemática o cuestión rectora de esta ponencia será: ¿Cómo identificar de buena manera (o mejor manera), injusticias epistémicas? Y nuestra tesis por defender es: *La teoría de la argumentación creada por Frans H. van Eemeren y sus colegas de la escuela de Amsterdam, la pragma-dialéctia, posibilita la identificación y análisis de injusticias epistémicas.* La división de este trabajo que proponemos para lograr nuestro objetivo planteado, es la siguiente:

1. Injusticias epistémicas; la relevancia de su identificación, análisis y críticas 2. La pragma-dialéctica como herramienta analítica argumentativa ante injusticias epistémicas
3. Análisis pragma-dialéctico en casos de nuestra vida cotidiana
4. Reflexiones finales.

La identificación y esquematización, o diagramación de las cuatro etapas: confrontación, apertura, argumentación y conclusión, nos posibilitan, mostrar con claridad cómo se comete una injusticia epistémica, término acuñado por Miranda Fricker que se remite a "[…]causar un mal a alguien en su condición específica de sujeto de conocimiento." (Fricker, 2017: 17) Esto puede darse de dos formas: testimonial y hermenéutica, la primera es: "Cuando hay prejuicios identitarios en el entorno discursivo, existe riesgo de incurrir en el ejemplo de la injusticia testimonial que hemos denominado central (déficit de credibilidad prejuicioso identitario)." (Fricker, 2017: 147) La hermenéutica se da no por un individuo sino por un colectivo "[…]sitúa alguien en una desventaja injusta en lo relativo a la comprensión de sus experiencias sociales." (Fricker, 2017:18) La pragma-dialéctica permite mostrar un análisis argumentativo con un fuerte potencial relevante que va más allá de la mera identificación de las fases argumentativas. Es decir, no se reduce a ser una herramienta analítica sino crítica también. No sólo permite identificar y diagramar en este caso injusticias epistémicas, sino también se convierte en una herramienta para enfrentar dichas injusticias.

June 9 Speakers

Waleed Mebane
University of Windsor

Anonymity and Logical Structure in Computer-supported Dialogue for Public Justification of Public Policy Options

A model of non-personal anonymous argumentation that could be used for justifying policy options publicly as part of computer mediated (e.g., online) deliberation dialogues is presented. Arguments are structured, i.e., delineated into premises and conclusions as with arguments in logic. Also as with logic, the identity of the contributors of the (e.g., logical) statements makes no difference to the evaluation of the argument. Some premises may still have the credibility of the source as an evaluation criterion, but the source does not have to be identified as a participant in the dialogue. A source is just a name, and the authenticity of the source needs to be verified separately from any attestation of ownership made within the dialogue itself. The arguments are not personal. Not being identifiable, no participant needs to defend their character in regard to their assertion of any claim in the dialogue. Instead, they may (but are not required to) defend claims with evidence that those claims are true.

What is called "anonymity" online commonly takes the form of pseudonymity; users of a social network, discussion forum, or chat service that supports pseudonyms or, simply, does not check that adopted names are users' real names contribute to discussions without ordinarily revealing their real identities, but they maintain a persistent assumed identity. That means inappropriate contributions (such as irrelevant or repetitive contributions—spam) may be punished or may damage the reputation associated with the pseudonym. That may drive participants to try to preserve their reputation but also induce them to defend their characters against (even unfounded or purposely distracting) abusive ad hominem arguments. In contrast, a dialogue that eliminates public participant identifiers is presented.

Participants still may be held accountable to keep their statements consistent by having their statements privately tracked. An automated assistant keeps track of participant identities without making them public and prevents participants from contributing a new premise without first withdrawing support from contrary premises. Support for premises comes in the form of votes, and acceptable premises may either be supported by arguments or if they are not supported by arguments, they must be supported by the votes of greater than 50% of participants. In that way, weak arguments (potentially including spam) may be sidelined until their advocates have given their premises enough support from arguments using other already accepted premises. And participants still may be held accountable not to contribute obviously (or egregiously) off-topic or spam content in a similar way to the private tracking mentioned above (e.g., including having content flagged by other users).

Using the anonymity and logical structure, the personal may be limited in the argumentation. Power relations lose much of their relevance in the dialogue. (Some minimum amount of freedom and equality must exist in the broader society to prevent participants from being influenced, e.g., by threats, from outside of the dialogue.) Participants may focus on establishing conclusions on the basis of evidence.

Ewa Modrzejewska

University of Warsaw

The Argumentative Role of Numbers in Infographics on COVID-19

The subject of this paper is a multimodal analysis of the rhetorical argumentation contained in infographics on the COVID-19 pandemic. This hybrid genre, which has become particularly prevalent in the era of digital platforms and access to data sets, is characterized by the combination of a textual, numerical, and visual layers, both separately and together, which can convey reasoning. The goal of this paper is to elaborate on the argumentative potential of this kind of multimodal genre.

A set of 22 infographics (both in English and Polish) retrieved from the official information service of the Council of the EU and the European Council was analyzed. The data set was collected for the two-year period (March 2020-2022) by filtering official infographic resources labeled with the tag 'COVID-19'.

The specific aim of the analysis is to investigate the functions of the numerical data used in this type of message, to determine their argumentative potential and persuasive character on the one hand. On the other hand, it raises the question of whether quantitative data might be treated as a sub-mode in the multimodal argumentative analysis, which will be discussed in the conclusions.

Deven Burks

University of Luxembourg

Echo Chambers, Empirical Underdetermination, and Epistemic Panic

For many, echo chambers are a potent driver of negative societal outcomes like polarization and distrust. Echo chambers differ from related psychological phenomena and social-epistemic structures insofar as they distort interpersonal trust. On one prominent rendering, their core property is the manipulation of in-group and out-group epistemic credentials and trustworthiness via a "disagreement-reinforcement mechanism" (Nguyen 2020: 147). However persuasive this rendering may be, it is unclear whether there exists an empirical proxy for this mechanism. I argue that, absent a proxy, the political psychology underlying echo chambers remains empirically underdetermined, meaning that one ought temporarily to suspend judgment on the causal connection between echo chambers and societal outcomes in order to avert a deepening epistemic panic with its own consequences for trust. First, I break down the argumentative logic connecting echo chambers and societal outcomes into separate empirical and normative claims. The adequacy of the normative claim does not permit reliable inference to the adequacy of the empirical claim or vice versa. Second, I recapitulate Nguyen's (2020) account of echo chambers and the disagreement-reinforcement mechanism. While it may establish the normative claim necessary for a causal connection between echo chambers and societal outcomes, it does not establish the empirical claim. Third, I consider three candidate proxies for the disagreement-reinforcement mechanism which might suffice for the empirical claim: backfire effects, false flags, depth of treatment. Each proves unsatisfactory. Fourth, I advise that we suspend judgment lest current discourse around echo chambers stoke an epistemic panic with distinct ethical-epistemic harms.

Sebastian Cacean
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology

Must Bullshit Arguments Be Represented by the Media? Balancing Variety and Reasonableness in Public Debates

According to gatekeeping theory, media controls the selection and framing of information presented to citizens. This power comes with responsibilities. The media must "serve the public communication needs of a democratic society" by enabling citizens to engage in public discourse over matters of common interest (Glasser, 1984, 137). Proponents of deliberative democracy even demand that the media must help to improve the epistemic quality of public deliberation. Argumentative contexts—that is, contexts in which media aspires to provide an overview or representation of a specific public debate—play an essential role in reaching these goals. How should the media balance impartiality and accuracy in these contexts? More specifically, which perspectives and viewpoints should be included? Is there a necessary level of relevance or reasonableness arguments and reasons have to satisfy? Is the media obliged to explain arguments or to reveal implicit considerations? Should fallacies and reasoning errors be debunked?

I argue that argumentation theory can help answer these questions, and will proceed along the following steps: First, I discuss how the trade-off between impartiality and accuracy is balanced in the context of scientific issues. To avoid a "false balance", the media must weigh different perspectives on scientific issues according to evidential standards and the diversity of views in the scientific community. Consequently, scientific facts should not be presented alongside or equal to positions that are inconsistent with them.

This account is, however, only of limited use. First, the requirement of avoiding a false balance applies to established facts. In contrast to scientific issues, the media should treat opposing opinions and subjective values equally worthy. The latter often play a role in public debate. It is, therefore, questionable whether the requirement of avoiding a false balance has any direct implications for argumentative contexts. Second, the understanding of arguments is hermeneutically underdetermined. Accordingly, classifying arguments as sufficiently reasonable or fallacious depends on subjective interpretative decisions. Again, mere subjective differences should be balanced equally in media.

Based on the false balance account, I will finally show how argumentation theory can meet these challenges. Avoiding false balance is grounded in expertise and the division of epistemic labour. If a society can avail itself of trustworthy experts in a specific domain, the media should present different viewpoints within this domain proportionally to the diversity of opinions among experts and not among all citizens. This idea can be transferred to argumentative contexts in the following way. First, in the same way as scientific expertise should constrain the presentation of scientific issues in media, a conceptualisation of argumentative expertise clarifies the extent to which argumentation experts should guide the presentation of arguments in media. Second and in relation to the first point, analysing argumentation can identify the relevant knowledge domains in a specific debate. Accordingly, argumentation analysis can help determine and distinguish the different types of expertise needed in a public debate.

Carly S. Woods

University of Maryland

Power, Argumentation Theory, and 'Debate Me' Imperatives

Scholars of argumentation tend to be in the business of encouraging and promoting debate. In general, we take that *people should debate* for granted. Under what conditions should people decline an invitation to debate? This question offers one lens through which scholars can explore issues of power, entitlement, and inclusivity in the way debates coalesce in the 21st century public sphere(s). In this presentation, we focus on the case of U.S. Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (NY-14). In recent years, Ocasio-Cortez has been repeatedly challenged to unscheduled public debates and derided when she ignores or declines the invitation. During the same period, she has been subjected to daily threats of violence. While it is possible to suggest that this is an unsurprising manifestation of a polarized political culture, we maintain that Ocasio-Cortez's experience must be understood as the confluence of power–as a form of racialized misogyny–and hyperpublicity (Pfister, 2014)–the expectations of increased access and public performance that the 24-hour news cycle and social media platforms enable. Our framework for analysis combines insights from argumentation theory research on hostility (Jørgensen, 1998) and free speech fallacies (Aikin & Casey, 2023) with scholarship about power, communication, and digital media (Jankowicz, 2022; Hong, 2020) to better understand what has been deemed "Debate Me" culture. In this essay, we review several instances between 2018 and 2023 in which high-profile conservative politicians and pundits have insisted that Ocasio-Cortez debate them. Ultimately, we argue that this phenomenon– and Ocasio-Cortez's responses– should prompt reconsideration of a classic essay that centered human relationships in argumentation: Wayne Brockriede's (1972) "Arguers as Lovers." While pedagogical experiences had previously led us to question the enduring relevance of the article, Ocasio-Cortez's likening of an ill-intentioned debate invitation to catcalling reintroduces the issue of argumentative agency and consent in a way that may allow us to productively expand on Brockriede's framework and offer insights for future research in this area.

Sarah Partlow Lefevre

Idaho State University

Pseudo-Reasoning in Visual Evidence of Conspiracy: A Examination of visual pseudo-reasoning in Nobody Died At Sandy Hook

This project is an outgrowth of a larger project about inhospitable arguments in conspiracy theories. I define inhospitable argument as argumentation used to justify rhetoric or actions that makes the target feel unwelcome in public dialogue. Inhospitable argument is characterized by pseudo-reasoning and specious applications of argumentation theory including use of fallacies, misuse of evidence, and representation of valid argument structures as sound representations of reality. In contemporary mediascapes, convergence on the internet and information gatekeepers' control over public information has been severely limited. Wild public networks make possible viral sharing of claims, no matter their argumentative or factual merit. Visual imagery advances argumentative claims on these networks that often go unquestioned. While the debate about whether or not images can argue has been largely resolved, there exists little examination of the possibility of pseudo-reasoning in visual argument. In this essay, I draw on my growing theory of inhospitable argument to assess imagery presented as evidence in *Nobody Died at Sandy Hook*. The book presents various photographs to support the thesis that the school was a set for a crisis performance. Drawing from my examination of the imagery, I propose a few characteristics of pseudo-reasoning in visual

argument including: use of poor quality images, de-contextualization of images, enthymematic calls to believers to conduct their own examination of selected imagery, failure to provide the audience with documentation to secure original images, misuse of credibility, and misuse of reasoning by sign. Additionally, use of visual flags, visual demonstrations, visual metaphor, visual symbols, and archetypes as arguments are used to represent flawed arguments as absolute truth claims.

Timothy Barouch

Georgia State University

Conspiracies: Amateur Epistemology and the Limits of Argumentation

This essay derives a working theory of conspiracy discourse for democratic practice from the tradition of the scholarly study of argumentation. Conspiracy theories have taken on an urgency due to their social effects, including resistance to public policies, acts of violence, and political polarization. The number of controversies that can claim belief in conspiracy as a partial cause includes: the birther movement, climate denialism, the muted effectiveness of public health efforts to contain COVID-19, Pizzagate, and the supposed corruption of the 2020 U.S. Presidential election.

Scholars in the fields of argumentation, political science, and psychology have taken an interest in conspiracy theories to counteract these effects. Recent research has coalesced around at least two distinct research trajectories. One line utilizes argumentation *as a method*, mapping arguments through reconstruction (van Eemeren et al., 2002) or argument schemes (Walton, Reed, and Macagno, 2008) to test where they go wrong as a matter of logic. This line includes the study of doubt in the maintenance and growth of conspiracy theories (Mohammed and Rossi, 2022), the recurring patterns that give conspiracy theories an argument profile with rhetorical effects (Oswald, 2016), and the consideration of conspiracy theories as a form of 'deep disagreement' (Ranalli, 2021).

Simultaneously, an interdisciplinary conversation has emerged related to notions of a variety strategies for addressing conspiracy theories, including "inoculation" and "confrontation." This line of research utilizes argumentation *as strategic practice* for a kind of benevolent social engineering. The former strategy seeks to strengthen resistance to conspiracy theories by preemptively refuting potential false information (Traberg et al., 2022). The latter strategy counters the misinformation circulating on certain platforms known to cater to ideologically aligned publics (Romer and Jamieson, 2020).

The paper constructs a theory of conspiracies as claim-types with sociological ordering functions. Instead of approaching these kinds of arguments as socially malignant theories, it begins from the premise that all of us think, speak, and argue as if the world is against us at times. Rather than test conspiracy theories with reference to a specific logical model or generating experimental strategies to oppose conspiracy theories – both worthy and fruitful endeavors – this paper understands conspiracy arguments as causal claims that question the dominant social order. If conspiracy theories are understood as arguments that respond to the failure to stabilize social reality, moments of revelation become important as a transition point, beyond which believers operate within a world of justification and proof radically different from that of non-believers.

The paper then mines the argumentation tradition to highlight the pragmatic consequences that would flow from this working understanding. These include: 1) that conspiracy claims are made by heterogenous arguers for diverse audiences; 2) that platform affordances and modalities constrain conspiracy arguments *in situ*; and 3) these realities entail some qualifications for the ethics of argumentation as a democratic

practice. Although these conclusions suggest argumentative modesty, it has always been an important democratic capacity for people to understand the limits of argumentative practice.

Jiaxing Li
Nankai University & University of Windsor
Advancing Democracy through Rhetorical Argumentation Evaluation — Exploring First-Order and Second-Order Perspectives in Political Discourse

In the context of politics, argumentation evaluation plays a crucial role in assessing the quality of political discourse and promoting democratic deliberation. This paper focuses on the role of rhetoric as a key approach in argumentation evaluation and explores the first-order and second-order perspectives of rhetoric in political discourse. Drawing upon theories of rhetoric, argumentation theory, and politics, this paper argues that advancing democracy requires a correct understanding of how rhetoric can contribute to the evaluation of argumentation in political discourse.

The first-order perspective of rhetoric entails examining the use of persuasive strategies, stylistic elements, and language use in political discourse. This perspective recognizes that rhetoric plays a crucial role in shaping public opinion and influencing decision-making in democratic societies. Moreover, the second-order perspective of rhetoric, as part of the meta-level analysis of arguments, goes beyond the content of the arguments and involves critically evaluating normative dimensions under the specific rhetorical situation. It considers how the arguments are strategically crafted and communicated to achieve persuasive effectiveness, such as the strategic use of argumentation schemes, fallacies, and audience adaptation, in assessing the reasonableness and coherence of arguments in the context of political discourse.

This paper argues that integrating first-order and second-order rhetorical approaches can help improve the evaluation of argumentation, enhance democratic deliberation, and promote civic engagement. This paper contributes to the understanding of the complex interplay between rhetoric and argumentation evaluation in the context of democracy and provides insights into effective and objective approaches for evaluating political arguments from both first-order and second-order perspectives.

Pedro Henrique Carrasqueira
State University of Campinas (UNICAMP)

A new paradox of tolerance

Popper has famously argued that political tolerance can't be unlimited, for then even limited tolerance would eventually become impossible. It is commonly believed that a substantial amount of tolerance towards some minorities is an integral part of democracy, in the sense that the social rules, or socially prevalent values, of a democratic society are supposed to make room for the typical life choices of those groups. Historically, however, tolerance emerged as an essentially liberal concept, not a democratic one. Sen's well-known theorem on the impossibility of a Paretian liberal already casts some serious doubt on whether liberalism is fully compatible with democracy, at least given some fairly natural assumptions on the rationality of social norms. In this work I follow Sen's lead and, using the same tools of social choice theory as he does, prove a similar impossibility theorem, --- one to the effect that even a minimal degree of tolerance is incompatible with certain requirements of democratic ruling, if social rules are supposed to be stable in a precise sense. The reason why stability of norms is generally desirable, and specially for a tolerant society, is that it can be shown that, if social norms are not stable in the specified sense, then individuals will sometimes have an incentive to remain steadfast in their partisan position on an issue even though the

norms recommend moderation on that issue. It is then argued that, even if those democratic requirements are weakened so as to make toleration compatible with the stability of norms, the stronger practice of affirmation remains incompatible.

Loris Isabettini

University of Windsor

Kisceral Argumentation, Christian Mysticism, and Music: Exploring the Intersections of Spiritual Experience and Democratic Participation

This presentation explores the connections between Kisceral argumentation, Christian mysticism, and Music within the broader context of the power and politics of democracy. The Argumentation Network of the Americas (ANA) conference provides an ideal platform for examining these intricate relationships and their potential impact on democratic participation, particularly in light of the pressing concerns surrounding argumentation, power, and political involvement.

Kisceral argumentation offers a novel perspective on the role of emotions, spirituality, and non-rational elements in argumentation. By examining the intersections between Kisceral argumentation and Christian mysticism, this presentation will delve into how spiritual experiences can inform and influence democratic participation. Music, as a powerful form of emotional and spiritual expression, will be considered a tool for enhancing the quality of argumentation and fostering a more inclusive, open, and meaningful democratic dialogue.

The presentation will address various themes relevant to the conference, including the democratic norms of argumentation, educating for democratic participation, and the role of argumentation in political extremism. By analyzing the unique contributions of Christian mysticism and Music to Kisceral argumentation, we will explore the potential of these elements to promote a more inclusive, tolerant, and empathetic democratic culture. This exploration will contribute to ongoing discussions about the role of argumentative roles and power, advances in deliberative democracy, and the intersection of argumentation and access to democracy.

As political polarization, extremism, and terrorism continue to challenge the fabric of democratic societies, the potential efficacy of bridging and bonding rhetoric becomes increasingly essential. This presentation will also consider how Kisceral argumentation, Christian mysticism, and Music may contribute to developing effective strategies for overcoming deep political disagreement and fostering a more unified and cooperative democratic environment.